Abstract. A precise description of the convexity of Gaussian measures is provided by sharp Brunn-Minkowski type inequalities due to Ehrhard and Borell. We show that these are manifestations of a game-theoretic mechanism: a minimax variational principle for Brownian motion. As an application, we obtain a Gaussian improvement of Barthe's reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality.
Introduction
The convexity properties of probability measures play an important role in various areas of probability theory, analysis, and geometry. They arise in a fundmental manner, for example, in the study of concentration phenomena [28, 2] and in functional analysis and convex geometry [12, 1] . Among the most delicate results in this area are the remarkable convexity properties of Gaussian measures [14, 31, 27, 8, 10] . The aim of this paper is to shed some new light on the latter topic.
Let γ n be the standard Gaussian measure on R n . The simplest expression of the convexity of Gaussian measures is given by the log-concavity property:
λ log(γ n (A)) + (1 − λ) log(γ n (B)) ≤ log(γ n (λA + (1 − λ)B)) for all λ ∈ [0, 1] and Borel sets A, B ⊆ R n , where A + B := {x + y : x ∈ A, y ∈ B} denotes Minkowski addition. This inequality is easily deduced from the classical Brunn-Minkowski inequality, which is the analogous statement for Lebesgue measure. However, while the importance of log-concavity can hardly be overstated, we expect in the case of Gaussian measures that convexity should appear in a much stronger form than can be explained by log-concavity alone. For example, the classical isoperimetric inequality for Euclidean volume is an easy and fundamental consequence of the Brunn-Minkowski inequality [21] , but log-concavity fails to explain the analogous isoperimetric property of Gaussian measures [27] .
A precise description of the convexity of Gaussian measures was developed in a remarkable paper by Ehrhard [14] , who introduced the following sharp analogue of the Brunn-Minkowski inequality for Gaussian measures:
where Φ(x) := γ 1 ((−∞, x]). This inequality becomes equality when A, B are parallel halfspaces, and is a strict improvement over log-concavity as the function log Φ is concave. It has numerous interesting and important implications, including the isoperimetric property of Gaussian measures that arises as a special case [27, 31] .
Given the fundamental nature of Ehrhard's inequality, it is natural to seek other Gaussian analogues of the rich family of results that appear in the classical BrunnMinkowski theory (cf. [21, 4] and the references therein). Progress in this direction has remained relatively limited, however. Unlike the classical Brunn-Minkowski inequality, which is well understood from many different perspectives, only two approaches to Ehrhard's inequality are known. Ehrhard's original proof [14] , using a Gaussian analogue of Steiner symmetrization, is limited to the case where the sets A, B are convex; it was later extended by Lata la [26] to eliminate the convexity assumption on one of the two sets. The long-standing problem of proving Ehrhard's inequality for arbitrary Borel sets was finally settled by Borell [8] , who also introduced a number of significant generalizations of this inequality [9, 10] . Borell's elegant approach, using a nonlinear heat equation and the parabolic maximum principle, relies on some delicate cancellations (as will be explained below), complicating efforts to identify how it can be applied in other settings. A more abstract variant of Borell's approach is given in [5, 24] , but the mechanism that makes this approach work remains somewhat mysterious. Let us note, in addition, that unlike many other geometric inequalities (including the Gaussian isoperimetric inequality) that extend to more general settings, Ehrhard's inequality appears to be uniquely Gaussian; see [25, §4.3] for some discussion on this point.
The aim of this paper is to develop a new interpretation of Ehrhard's inequality: we will show that both Ehrhard's inequality and its generalizations due to Borell arise as manifestations of a stochastic game that appears to lie at the heart of these phenomena. This unexpected game-theoretic mechanism provides new insight into the success of earlier proofs, and allows us to identify new convexity results for Gaussian measures. In particular, we will develop a Gaussian improvement of Barthe's reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality, addressing a question posed in [5] .
1.1. Borell's stochastic method. To motivate the ideas that will be introduced in the sequel, let us begin by recalling a powerful approach, also due to Borell [7] , for proving log-concavity of Gaussian measures.
In order to show that γ n (or any other measure) is log-concave, it is natural to seek a representation formula for log(γ n (A)) from which the concavity property becomes evident. A fundamental representation of this type, the Gibbs variational principle, dates back to the earliest work on statistical mechanics [22] : log e f dγ n = sup
where H(µ||γ n ) denotes relative entropy and the supremum is taken over all probability measures µ. The log-concavity property could be read off directly from this formulation using displacement convexity of relative entropy as developed in the theory of optimal transportation [35] . However, in the case of Gaussian measures, a simpler approach becomes available by identifying γ n with the distribution of the value of a Brownian motion {W t } at time one. The advantage gained by this approach is that absolutely continuous changes of measure of Brownian motion admit an explicit characterization by Girsanov's theorem [32] , which gives rise to the following reformulation of the Gibbs variational principle for Gaussian measures:
where the supremum is taken over all progressively measurable processes α. This formula was originally obtained using PDE methods by Fleming [18] ; the connection with the Gibbs variational principle was developed by Boué and Dupuis [11] . It was observed by Borell in [7] that log-concavity of the Gaussian measure is an almost immediate consequence of this identity. Let us illustrate this idea in its functional (Prékopa-Leindler) form. Let f, g, h be functions such that
for all x, y, and denote by α f and α g the maximizing processes when the above representation is applied to log f and log g, respectively. Then we have
≤ log h dγ n .
Log-concavity follows readily by choosing f = 1 A , g = 1 B , and h = 1 λA+(1−λ)B . The beauty of this stochastic approach is that it reduces log-concavity of Gaussian measures to a trivial fact, viz. convexity of the function x → x 2 . This idea has been further developed in [29, 30, 13] to prove various other inequalities, some of which do not seem to be readily accessible by other methods.
It is tempting to approach Ehrhard's inequality by seeking a Gaussian improvement of the Gibbs variational principle. It is far from clear, however, why this should be possible. The Gibbs variational principle is not a mysterious result: it simply expresses Fenchel duality for the convex functional f → log( e f dγ n ). On the other hand, classical results of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya [23, §3.16] imply that the functional f → Φ −1 ( Φ(f ) dγ n ) cannot be convex. In his proof of Ehrhard's inequality [8] , Borell circumvents the lack of a representation formula by using partial differential equation methods. As a first step, he obtains a PDE for the transformation v f (t, x) := Φ −1 (u f (t, x)) of the solution u f (t, x) of the heat equation with initial condition f (the latter arises naturally in this setting as the Markov semigroup of Brownian motion). It is not immediately obvious that the resulting nonlinear PDE, given in section 2.2 below, possesses any useful convexity properties. Instead, Borell considers directly the desired combination C(t, x, y) := λv f (t, x) + (1 − λ)v g (t, y) − v h (t, λx + (1 − λ)y), and observes that a fortuitous cancellation occurs: one can arrange the terms in the combined PDEs for v f , v g , v h to obtain a parabolic PDE for C alone. This makes it possible to apply the parabolic maximum principle to deduce nonpositivity of C, which is essentially the statement of Ehrhard's inequality in its functional form.
1.2. The Borell-Ehrhard game. The main result of the present paper is a new stochastic representation formula that lies at the heart of Ehrhard's inequality, in direct analogy with Borell's stochastic approach to log-concavity. This principle provides significant insight into the mechanism behind the convexity properties of Gaussian measures, as well as a new tool to study such properties.
As was explained above, the lack of convexity of f → Φ −1 ( Φ(f ) dγ n ) prohibits us from obtaining a representation formula by a convex duality argument. Instead, our main result shows that this functional can be represented by a minimax variational principle. An informal statement of our main result is as follows.
Theorem (informal statement). For bounded and uniformly continuous f
This expression can be interpreted as the value of a zero-sum stochastic game between two players. The first player can apply a force α t at time t to the underlying Brownian motion. The second player cannot affect the dynamics of the Brownian motion, but can instead choose to end the game prematurely: her control β t is the rate of termination of the game at time t (that is, the game ends prematurely in the interval [t, t + dt) with probability β t 2 dt). The remarkable feature of this game is that the running cost α t , β t is not quadratic, as in the stochastic representation used to prove log-concavity, but rather linear in α. This reflects the fact that the Φ −1 transformation lies precisely at the border of where we can expect convexity to appear: it "linearizes" the quadratic cost that arises from the Gibbs variational principle. (It is pointed out in [13] that log-concavity of γ n can be strengthened in a different sense by exploiting uniform convexity of the quadratic cost.)
As is typical in the theory of continuous-time games, it is essential to carefully define the information structure available to each player in order for the above stochastic representation to be valid. In section 2, we provide a precise formulation and proof of our main result. The essential observation behind the proof is that our stochastic game is closely connected to Borell's PDE approach to Ehrhard's inequality: the nonlinear heat equation of Borell can be identified as the BellmanIsaacs equation [34, 19] for the value of our stochastic game. This observation leads not only to the above representation, but also reveals the reason behind the hidden convexity that appears somewhat mysteriously in Borell's proof.
With the above stochastic representation in hand, it is a simple exercise to deduce Ehrhard's inequality, and its generalizations due to Borell, in complete analogy to the stochastic proof of log-concavity. This exercise is carried out in section 3.
1.3.
A Gaussian reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality. As an illustration of the power of the stochastic approach, we will use it to obtain a Gaussian improvement of the reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality of Barthe [3, 5] . Let us first recall Barthe's inequality in its Brunn-Minkowski form (see section 4 for the functional form). Let E 1 , . . . , E k be linear subspaces of R n with dim(E i ) = n i . Denote by P i the orthogonal projection on E i , and let λ 1 , . . . , λ k ≥ 0 be such that λ 1 P 1 +· · ·+λ k P k = I n . Then Barthe's inequality states that for any Borel sets A i ⊆ E i , we have
where we identify γ ni with the standard Gaussian measure on E i . This is an extension of the log-concavity property where the sets A i may lie in lower-dimensional subspaces of the ambient space (in which case log-concavity is a trivial statement).
In view of Ehrhard's inequality, one might hope that it is possible to replace the logarithm by Φ −1 in Barthe's inequality to obtain a Gaussian improvement. However, this is certainly impossible in general: if E 1 , . . . , E k are orthogonal subspaces that span R n , then Barthe's inequality is in fact equality for all choices of A i and no Gaussian improvement is possible (see section 4.1). Nonetheless, it is possible to systematically improve Barthe's inequality in the Gaussian setting, as we will do in section 4. To this end, define for every c ∈ (0, 1) the function
We will show in section 4 that, under the same assumptions as in Barthe's inequality,
for every c ∈ (0, 1). From this inequality, one can recover both Barthe's inequality (c ↓ 0) and Ehrhard's inequality (c ↑ 1) as special cases. The stochastic game approach was essential to discovering the correct formulation of this inequality.
1.4. Generalized means. While our main result sheds new light on the mechanism behind Ehrhard's inequality, there remains some residual mystery regarding the origin of this stochastic game. The stochastic representation used to prove log-concavity is entirely natural, as it arises simply as a specialization of the Gibbs variational principle to the Brownian setting. It is unclear, however, whether there exists a natural minimax generalization of the Gibbs variational principle that can provide an analogous explanation for the Borell-Ehrhard game.
From another perspective, however, there is nothing particularly surprising about the stochastic representations that we encountered so far. To place these results in a broader context, we can consider the more general functional f → F −1 ( F (f ) dγ n ) for any strictly increasing function F . Such functionals, called generalized means, were studied by Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya [23, chapter 3] , who provide in particular necessary and sufficient conditions for such functionals to be convex. In section 5, we will show that any convex generalized mean admits a stochastic representation that is very similar to the special case F (x) = e x , from which convexity can be immediately read off. Moreover, we will argue that essentially arbitrary choice of F will admit a stochastic game representation, so the appearance of a game in the case F (x) = Φ(x) is just one specific example. Of course, it is a special feature of this example that gave rise to Ehrhard's inequality; the potential utility of such representations in other contexts will depend on the problem at hand.
2. The Borell-Ehrhard game 2.1. Setting and main result. Let (Ω, F , {F t }, P) be a probability space with a complete and right-continuous filtration, and let {W t } be a standard n-dimensional F t -Brownian motion. We denote by γ n the standard Gaussian measure on R n and by Φ(x) := γ 1 ((−∞, x]). Our main result is a variational principle for Gaussian measures that will be expressed as a stochastic game for the Brownian motion W .
As is often the case in continuous time games, it is important to carefully define what information is available to each player. Informally, we can view our game as the continuous time limit of a discrete time game where two players take turns exercising some control on the underlying Brownian motion. We denote the controls of the first and second players at time t by α t and β t , respectively. As the second player comes after the first, her control may depend on the choice of control of the first player. Conversely, the control of the first player may depend on the choice of control of the second player in earlier turns. It is not entirely obvious how this information structure should be encoded when time is continuous.
For our purposes, it will be convenient to adopt an approach due to Elliott and Kalton [15, 19] . In this framework, the second player may choose any control. Definition 2.1. A control is a progressively measurable n-dimensional process β = {β t } t∈ [0, 1] . Denote by C the family of all controls such that E[
On the other hand, the action of the first player must explicitly account for the fact that she has access to the earlier choice of control of the second player. To this end, we introduce the notion of an (Elliott-Kalton) strategy.
Definition 2.2.
A strategy is a map α : C → C such that for every t ∈ [0, 1] and
Denote by S the family of all strategies such that sup{E[
In the Elliott-Kalton approach, the second player chooses any control β ∈ C, while the first player's control α(β) is defined by a strategy α ∈ S. The definition of a strategy ensures that the control of the first player depends causally on the control of the second player, thereby encoding the desired information structure.
With these formalities out of the way, we can now formulate our main result.
Theorem 2.3. Let f : R n → R be bounded and uniformly continuous, and define
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.3. The connection with geometric inequalities will be developed in sections 3 and 4 below.
The Borell PDE.
Throughout the proof, we will assume without loss of generality that f is bounded, smooth, and has bounded derivatives of all orders. Once the result is proved in this case, the conclusion is readily extended to functions f that are only bounded and uniformly continuous (as the latter can be approximated in the uniform topology by smooth functions with bounded derivatives by convolution with a smooth compactly supported kernel, cf. [20, §8.2]).
so that u solves the heat equation
By the smoothness assumption on f and elementary properties of the heat equation, u and therefore v are bounded, smooth, and have bounded derivatives of all orders on [0, 1] × R n . Moreover, it is readily verified that v satisfies
This equation was introduced by Borell [8] in his study of the Ehrhard inequality.
The following simple observation contains the main idea behind the proof of Theorem 2.3: the nonlinear term in Borell's PDE admits a variational interpretation.
where the optimizer a
Proof. Define for a, b ∈ R n the objective
Then it is readily verified that
But note that as 2c ≥ f , we have 2c
and the proof is complete.
Lemma 2.4 reveals that the partial differential equation satisfied by v is none other than the Bellman-Isaacs equation for the value of a stochastic game [19, 34] . We can now proceed along mostly standard lines to formalize this idea.
2.3.
Upper bound. Fix 2c ≥ f , and consider the stochastic differential equation
As the function (c − v)∇v is smooth with bounded derivatives, this equation has a unique strong solution X β [32, Theorem 4.8]. Define
it is uniformly bounded) and α * depends causally on β. Thus we have shown that α * ∈ S defines an Elliott-Kalton strategy. Applying Itô's formula to the process e
We now observe that the last integral in this expression is nonnegative by Borell's PDE and Lemma 2.4. Moreover, the Brownian integral is a martingale as ∇v is bounded. Therefore, taking the expectation of this expression, we obtain
for every β ∈ C. But evidentlyα * (β) := α * (β) + cβ defines another Elliott-Kalton strategyα * ∈ S. We therefore readily obtain the upper bound in Theorem 2.3
2.4. Lower bound. For the proof of the lower bound, fix any α ∈ S. Given this strategy, our aim is to construct a control β ∈ C that nearly minimizes
We will do this by imitating the idea that our continuous game is the limit of discrete-time games, as was explained informally at the beginning of this section.
To this end, fix a time step δ = N −1 (N ≥ 1). For t ∈ [0, δ), let β t := −∇v(0, 0). We now iteratively extend the definition of β as follows. Suppose that β has been defined on the interval [0, kδ). Then α t (β) is uniquely defined for a.e. t ∈ [0, kδ) (as α is causal by the definition of an Elliott-Kalton strategy). Writing
we define β t := −∇v(kδ, X kδ ) for t ∈ [kδ, (k + 1)δ). Iterating this process N − 1 times results in a control β ∈ C that is uniquely defined a.e. in [0, 1] × Ω.
Applying Itô's formula to e 
where
As v is bounded and has bounded derivatives of all orders, we can estimate
for constants C 1 , C 2 that depend on f only. Note that for t ≤ (k + 1)δ
We can therefore estimate using Cauchy-Schwarz
by definition as α ∈ S and where C 3 depends only on f . We have therefore shown that inf
As δ > 0 and α ∈ S were arbitrary, we readily conclude that
2.5. End of proof. Combining the upper and lower bound, we have shown
It remains to prove the second identity in Theorem 2.3. To this end, note that
as Φ(−x) = 1 − Φ(x). But we can write
As C is invariant under the transformation β → −β and S is invariant under the transformation α(β) → α(−β), the second identity in Theorem 2.3 follows.
The Ehrhard and Borell inequalities
The aim of this short section is to show that the classical Gaussian BrunnMinkowski inequality of Ehrhard [14, 8] and its generalizations due to Borell [9, 10] arise as immediate corollaries of Theorem 2.3. In section 4 below, we will extend this approach to derive new geometric inequalities for Gaussian measures.
3.1. Ehrhard's inequality. Ehrhard's inequality states that
for all Borel sets A, B ⊆ R n and λ ∈ [0, 1]. By approximating the indicator functions of A and B by smooth functions, it is routine to deduce this inequality from the following functional form of the result (see [8] or section 4.4 below). 
Proof. Fix δ > 0, and choose near-optimal α f , α g ∈ S and β h ∈ C such that
Then by Theorem 2.3
h dγ n + 3δ, and the proof is completed by letting δ ↓ 0.
3.2.
Borell's Gaussian Brunn-Minkowski inequalities. In [9] , Borell proves a substantial generalization of Ehrhard's inequaliy: he shows that
holds for all Borel sets A, B ⊆ R n if and only if λ + µ ≥ 1 and |λ − µ| ≤ 1 (the necessity of the latter conditions is easily verified by explicit examples, see [9] ). The deduction of this result from Theorem 2.3 requires only a minor modification of the proof of Corollary 3.1: it suffices to note that we do not need to choose the same Brownian motion W in the variational problems for f and g. By choosing instead two correlated Brownian motions, we immediately recover Borell's result. 
Proof. Let ρ = (1 − λ 2 − µ 2 )/2λµ. The assumptions λ + µ ≥ 1 and |λ − µ| ≤ 1 guarantee that ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. We can therefore define two standard n-dimensional Brownian motions {W t } and {W t } with quadratic covariation W i ,W j t = ρtδ ij . The point of this construction is that the process {W t } defined asW t := λW t +µW t is again a standard n-dimensional Brownian motion.
LetJ f ,J f be defined analogously to J f in Theorem 2.3 where {W t } is replaced by {W t } and {W t }, respectively. The remainder of the proof is identical to that of Corollary 3.1, where
Remark 3.3. We observe that it was essential for the success of the proof of Corollary 3.2 that the game described by Theorem 2.3 is defined on a general probability space: while the objective function J f [α, β] depends only on a single Brownian motion {W t }, we allowed the controls α, β ∈ C to be adapted to a larger filtration {F t } that is not necessarily generated by the underlying Brownian motion alone. This freedom was used crucially in the proof of Corollary 3.2; here we can take F t to be (the augmentation of) σ{W s ,W s : s ≤ t}, but we cannot ensure that the control λα f (β h ) + µα g (β h ) will depend only on {W t }.
The assumptions λ + µ ≥ 1 and |λ − µ| ≤ 1 in Corollary 3.2 are precisely the conditions required for the existence of correlated standard Brownian motions {W 1,t } and {W 2,t } such that λW 1 +µW 2 is also a standard Brownian motion. Along identical lines, we immediately see that the inequality
holds for all Borel sets A 1 , . . . , A k ⊆ R n whenever there exist correlated standard Brownian motions {W i,t }, i = 1, . . . , k such that λ 1 W 1 + · · · + λ k W k is again a standard Brownian motion. The family of coefficients λ 1 , . . . , λ k ≥ 0 for which this is the case is characterized by [5, Lemma 3] , and we recover in this manner the general Gaussian Brunn-Minkowski inequality of Borell [10] . ] as is explained in [27] . As these are standard results, we omit the details. However, in section 4.4 below, we will work out in detail a direct approximation argument in the setting of Theorem 4.2 that could also be applied here to deduce the measurable versions of Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2.
4.
A Gaussian reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality 4.1. Barthe's inequality. Both the classical Brunn-Minkowski inequality and Ehrhard's inequality bound the measure of the Minkowski sum λA + (1 − λ)B from below in terms of the measures of A and B. Therefore, when either A or B has measure zero, these inequalities necessarily become trivial. Nonetheless, it is perfectly possible for λA + (1 − λ)B to have positive measure even when A and B are, for example, contained in lower-dimensional subspaces of R n . This phenomenon is captured quantitatively by a significant generalization of the classical Brunn-Minkowski inequality due to Barthe [3] , which we presently recall.
Fix λ 1 , . . . , λ k ≥ 0, and let B 1 , . . . , B k be linear maps
Note that B * i isometrically embeds R ni in the linear subspace E i = Im(B * i ) of R n . Let f i : R ni → R and h : R n → R be functions such that
ni . Then Barthe's inequality states that
(see [5, 30] for the formulation in terms of Gaussian rather than Lebesgue measure). When f i are taken to be indicator functions of sets, this reduces to the following generalization of the Brunn-Minkowski inequality: for any Borel sets
where we implicitly identify γ ni with the standard Gaussian measure on E i .
Remark 4.1. Barthe's inequality is also called the reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality. The classical Brascamp-Lieb inequality is an analogous multilinear generalization of Hölder's inequality. Just as the Prékopa-Leindler inequality could formally be viewed as a reverse form of Hölder's inequality, Barthe's inequality can be viewed as a reverse form of the Brascamp-Lieb inequality. Let us note that we have stated the inequality in its "geometric" form, which is most natural for our purposes. The general form of the reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequality (for general matrices B i ) can be deduced from the geometric form, see [6] and [30] for details.
When n i = n and B i = I n for all i, Barthe's inequality reduces to the Prékopa-Leindler inequality. However, we know that the latter is far from optimal for Gaussian measures: the sharp form of the Prékopa-Leindler inequality in the Gaussian case is precisely Ehrhard's inequality (Corollary 3.1), where the logarithm is replaced by Φ −1 . It is therefore natural to ask whether there exists an analogous Gaussian improvement of Barthe's inequality. This question was raised in [5, §4.2]. We will show in section 4.2 that there does in fact exist an interesting family of inequalities of this form, but the correct formulation of such inequalities is not entirely obvious. Before we develop these inequalities, let us briefly discuss what sort of improvement could reasonably be expected.
One might optimistically hope that as in the case of Ehrhard's inequality, we may simply replace log by Φ −1 in Barthe's inequality to obtain the analogus Gaussian form. However, not only is this impossible, but in fact no improvement of Barthe's inequality is possible in general. To see why, consider the case where E 1 and E 2 are two orthogonal subspaces of R 2 , which forces λ 1 = λ 2 = 1. Suppose the inequality
holds for a function L. As
for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], which is clearly violated when L(x) = Φ −1 (x) (let x = y = 1 2 ). On the other hand, the above inequality holds with equality when L(x) = log x. It follows that Barthe's inequality is already optimal in the orthogonal setting and cannot be improved by any alternative choice of function L.
We have now considered two extreme cases. When E 1 = · · · = E k = R n , Ehrhard's inequality is sharp and the optimal choice of function is L = Φ −1 . On the other hand, when E 1 , . . . , E k are orthogonal subspaces, Barthe's inequality is sharp and the optimal choice of function is L = log. One can therefore not expect that any single choice of function L can provide a systematic Gaussian refinement of Barthe's inequality: any general improvement requires the choice of L to depend at least on the parameters λ i and B i . This feature is integral to the formulation of the Gaussian reverse Brascamp-Lieb inequalities that we will prove presently: we will introduce a family of inequalities that interpolate, in some sense, between the Ehrhard and Barthe inequalities; the best choice of inequality within this family must depend on the parameters to which it is applied.
A Gaussian refinement.
In the remainder of this section, we place ourselves in the same setting as in the above formulation of Barthe's inequality: that is, we fix λ 1 , . . . , λ k ≥ 0 and let B 1 , . . . , B k be linear maps
As before, we define the subspaces E i = Im(B * i ). We also define the function Φ
for c ∈ (0, 1). We will prove the following Gaussian form of Barthe's inequality. 
We immediately deduce the following generalization of Ehrhard's inequality.
Corollary 4.3. For any c ∈ (0, 1) and Borel sets A i ⊆ E i , i = 1, . . . , k, we have
It is instructive to note that both Ehrhard's inequality and Barthe's generalized Brunn-Minkowski inequality arise as limiting cases of Corollary 4.3.
Let us first recover Barthe's inequality. To this end, recall that
A simple computation shows that
This implies, in particular, that
Thus Barthe's Brunn-Minkowski inequality is recovered as c ↓ 0 in Corollary 4.3.
On the other hand, to recover Ehrhard's inequality, set n i = n and B i = I n for all i. This forces λ 1 + · · · + λ k = 1, so that Corollary 4.3 reduces to
Thus Ehrhard's inequality is recovered as c ↑ 1 in Corollary 4.3.
We have therefore seen that Corollary 4.3 is never worse than Barthe's BrunnMinkowski inequality, and can be substantially better. For general parameters, one has the freedom to optimize over c to obtain the best inequality in this family. 
where we used that B is a projection (so that γ m = γ n B −1 ).
Following verbatim the proof of the upper bound of Theorem 2.3, we have
for all β ∈ C, where α * ∈ S is a strategy of the form
for a suitably defined random process X β . The crucial observation at this point is that as ∇g(x) = B * ∇f (Bx), we have ∇v(t, x) ∈ Im(B * ) for all t, x. In particular, the optimal strategy α * satisfies B * Bα * (β) = α * (β) for every β ∈ C. Therefore
On the other hand, the corresponding lower bound follows immediately from Theorem 2.3 (as strategies of the form B * Bα(β)+ 
To complete the proof, it suffices to note that The proof is identical to that of Corollary 3.1, and we omit the details. 
Such an argument is given in [8] , and can be readily applied in the present setting. We therefore do not need the full strength of Theorem 4.2 to deduce Corollary 4.3. However, while the proof of Theorem 4.2 requires a bit more work, it yields a result that is potentially of broader utility. (Closely related approximation arguments can also be found in [13] . ) We begin by proving Theorem 4.2 in the case that f 1 , . . . , f k and h are uppersemicontinuous. The following lemma makes it possible to approximate uppersemicontinuous functions by uniformly continuous functions without violating the assumption of Theorem 4.2, so that Corollary 4.5 can be applied.
, and suppose that
Then there exist for every s > 0 uniformly continuous functions f
s with values in [ε, 1] such that
ni , and such that f 
It is easily seen that f 
As h s ≥ ε and h ≤ 1, this evidently implies x − y s ≤ s 2 − sΦ −1 c (ε) for all s, so that y s → x as s ↓ 0. But we can now estimate
where we have used that h is upper-semicontinuous in the last line. This shows that h s → h pointwise as s ↓ 0, and f s i → f i follows identically. Finally, note that
Using Lemma 4.7 and Corollary 4.5, we can now prove the following. Proof. We first approximate f 1 , . . . , f k , h by functions that are bounded away from zero. To this end, fix ε ∈ (0, 1) and let δ := max i Φ c (λ i Φ −1 c (ε)). Define the uppersemicontinuous functionsh := h ∨ δ andf i := f i ∨ ε for all i. We claim that
The conclusion follows using dominated convergence as s ↓ 0 and ε ↓ 0.
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
Thenh ≤ h by construction, andh is also upper-semicontinuous [33, Prop. 1.27]. Moreover, the upper-semicontinuous functionsf 1 , . . . ,f k andh clearly satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 4.2. Therefore, Corollary 4.8 implies
The conclusion now follows by taking the supremum on the left-hand side over all compactly supported upper-semicontinuous functionsf i ≤ f i [20, Prop. 7.14].
Generalized means
Unlike the logarithmic functional f → log( e f dγ n ), whose stochastic representation has a natural interpretation through the Gibbs variational principle, the emergence of a stochastic game representation for f → Φ −1 ( Φ(f ) dγ n ) may appear rather unexpected. To provide some further insight into such representations, we aim in this section to place the result of Theorem 2.3 in a broader context. Throughout this section, let I ⊂ R be a compact interval, and let F : I → R be a smooth function that is strictly increasing F ′ > 0. Following Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya [23, chapter 3], we define the generalized mean M F as
for any measurable function f : R n → I. We will argue below that the generalized mean M F admits a stochastic representation for any sufficiently regular function F : from this perspective, there is nothing particularly special about the specific cases F (x) = e x and F (x) = Φ(x) that we encountered so far. Of course, the potential utility of such stochastic representations in other settings depends on the problem at hand. For example, to establish Brunn-Minkowski type inequalities, we crucially exploited a special feature of the functions F (x) = e x and F (x) = Φ(x): in both cases, the running cost in the stochastic representation proves to be a concave function of the strategy that is being maximized over. While such structural features of the representation are specific to particular choices of F , the existence of a stochastic representation is not anything special in its own right.
In their study of generalized means, Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya [23, §3.16] obtained necessary and sufficient conditions for f → M F (f ) to be a convex functional. In section 5.1, we will show that stochastic representations provide an interesting perspective on this characterization: the conditions of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya are precisely those that are needed to obtain a stochastic representation for M F involving only a supremum (as in the case F (x) = e x ). In particular, we can state a very general expression for the stochastic representation in this setting, despite that the Fenchel transform of M F (and therefore the natural analogue of the Gibbs variational principle) rarely admits a tractable expression. For generalized means that are not convex, we will outline in section 5.2 how one can obtain in this case a stochastic game representation of M F under essentially no assumptions on F . As the explicit expressions that define such games for general F do not provide much insight, we do not state a general theorem, but rather illustrate by means of an example how easily such representations can be obtained in practice. • Convexity of F is necessary for M F to be convex.
• If F is strictly convex F ′′ > 0, then concavity of F ′ /F ′′ is necessary and sufficient for M F to be convex. For completeness, we spell out what happens when F is convex but fails to be strictly convex. We should consider two separate cases:
• If F ′′ vanishes everywhere in I, then F is linear and convexity of M F is trivial (note that in this case F ′ /F ′′ ≡ +∞ is clearly concave).
• If F ′′ vanishes at some point but not everywhere in I, then F ′ /F ′′ must blow up to +∞ near that point as we assumed that F ′ > 0 and that F is smooth. This implies there is a subinterval J ⊂ I on which F ′′ > 0 but where F ′ /F ′′ fails to be concave, so convexity of M F must fail.
We have therefore established all possible cases of Theorem 5.1.
When F (x) = e x , the condition of Theorem 5.1 is evidently satisfied; in this case, convexity of M F is simply the statement of Hölder's inequality. On the other hand, when F (x) = Φ(x), the condition for convexity fails to be satisfied on any interval I. In particular, while log-concavity could formally be viewed as a "reverse" form of Hölder's inequality, there cannot exist a Gaussian improvement of Hölder's inequality that is analogous to Ehrhard's improvement of log-concavity.
Remark 5.2. The proof of Theorem 5.1 shows that unless F is linear, convexity of the functional M F requires that F is strictly convex F ′′ > 0 everywhere in I. We will therefore assume the latter without loss of generality in our development of stochastic representations for convex generalized means.
The relevance of the conditions of Theorem 5.1 is far from obvious at first sight. We will presently see that these conditions arise in a very natural manner when we attempt to obtain a stochastic representation for M F .
We begin by developing the argument of section 2.2 in the present setting. Let f : R n → I be a Lipschitz function and define for (t,
so that u solves the heat equation. Define
Note that as F is smooth and F ′ > 0, the function F −1 is smooth by the inverse function theorem. Therefore, by elementary properties of the heat equation, v takes values in I, is smooth and has bounded derivatives of all orders on [0, 1 − ε] × R n for every ε > 0, and v(t, x) → f (x) uniformly in x as t → 1.
and the heat equation for u shows that v satisfies the PDE ∂v ∂t
We now readily see the relevance of the conditions of Theorem 5.1: as the function (x, y) → x 2 /y is convex for (x, y) ∈ R n × R + , the conditions of Theorem 5.1 are precisely those that ensure that the nonlinear term in this PDE is a convex function of (∇v, v). In particular, we can express this term as follows. 
where the optimizer is a
is simply the definition of the Fenchel conjugate. Moreover, as F is assumed to be smooth, the optimizer is given by b [33, Prop. 11.3] . The optimization over a is trivial.
Lemma 5.3 reveals that the partial differential equation satisfied by v is none other than the Bellman equation for the value of a stochastic control problem [18] .
Theorem 5.4. Let F : I → R be a nonlinear smooth and strictly increasing function such that M F is convex. Then M F admits the stochastic representation
for every lower-semicontinuous function f : R n → I, where 
As f is Lipschitz, ∇v is uniformly bounded so the stochastic integral is a martingale. Taking the expectation, and using Lemma 5.3 and the partial differential equation
It remains to note that the inequality is equality if we choose the optimal controls
where X t is the solution of the stochastic differential equation
Here we note that by our assumptions, F has bounded derivatives of all orders and F ′ and F ′′ are uniformly bounded away from zero, v and ∇v are uniformly bounded, and v(t, ·) has bounded derivatives of all orders for t < 1, so that this stochastic differential equation has a unique strong solution and α
n → I is Lipschitz for every k and f k ↑ f pointwise as in the proof of Lemma 4.7. The result follows using monotone convergence by applying the stochastic representation of M F (f k ) and taking the supremum over k. 
This result could also be obtained along the lines of [11] by applying Girsanov's theorem to the representation (
Example 5.7. Consider the case F (x) = xe
Substituting this expression into Theorem 5.4 yields
where W is the Lambert W -function and we defined β t := −γ 2 t to enforce nonpositivity. This expression can be simplified slightly by introducing the new control η t := |γ t |α t . Rearranging the above expression then yields We remark that the stochastic representation appears in surprisingly tractable form, while it is not clear whether it is possible to obtain a tractable analogue of the Gibbs variational principle M F (f ) = sup µ { f dµ − M * F (µ)} in this example. 5.2. Generalized means and stochastic games. The essential idea behind the proof of Theorem 5.4 was that when M F is convex, the nonlinear equation It has long been understood in the PDE literature that while convexity is a very special property, almost any reasonable nonlinearity can be expressed in the form of a game; see [16, 17] and the references therein. In the present context, this implies that it is possible to obtain stochastic game representations for generalized means M F under essentially no assumptions on the function F . Let us outline one particular approach to obtaining such representations. In (indeed, it suffices to note that a * = b * = x is a saddle point). Now assume, as in the general setting of this section, that F : I → R is a smooth function on the compact interval I that is strictly increasing F ′ > 0, and consider the function Ψ(x, y) = 1 2
Then the gradient of Ψ is locally bounded, and thus the above maximin representation holds. It is a simple exercise to repeat the proof of Theorem 2.3 in the present setting to obtain a completely general stochastic game representation for M F .
Remark 5.8. There are two minor issues that require care in extending Theorem 2.3 to the general setting. First, the representation will hold for functions f that are smooth with bounded derivatives, but one cannot trivially extend to bounded uniformly continuous functions (as in the present case the exponential factor in front of f in the representation need not have a universal upper bound). Second, for the same reason, one should work with the smaller classes of controls and strategies C b := {β ∈ C : β ∞ < ∞}, S b := {α ∈ S : sup β ∞≤R α(β) ∞ < ∞ ∀ R < ∞}.
Carrying out the approach outlined above would give rise to a very general representation of M F as a stochastic game. However, this representation is not canonical. The usefulness of a stochastic game representation in a given situation will generally rely on some structural properties of the representation that may be far from evident in this particular formulation. For example, applying the above representation to the case F (x) = Φ(x) yields a rather ugly expression from which one would be hard-pressed to conclude the validity of Ehrhard's inequality. While the existence of stochastic game representations for general M F sheds some light on the origin of the phenomenon observed in Theorem 2.3, a genuinely useful representation of this kind should be specifically chosen to possess the desired structural properties that are relevant to the problem under consideration. We have already seen an example of this in the previous section, where special representations were chosen for convex M F from which the convexity property becomes evident, and in Theorem 2.3. As a further illustration we provide one additional example.
Example 5.9. Consider F (x) = 1 − e −x 2 /2 on I = [ε, 2c] for 0 < ε < 2c < ∞. This function behaves very similarly to Φ(x) as x → ∞, at least to leading order in the exponent. We might therefore expect a stochastic game representation of M F that is similar to that of Theorem 2.3. Let us see how this can be achieved.
We begin by computing F ′′ (x) F ′ (x) = −x + 1 x .
Note that the term −x is precisely what arises for Φ, but we now have an additional term. To obtain a representation that is similar to that for Φ, we apply Lemma 2.4 to the first term and introduce an additional control for the second term: 1 2
